Predicting Strategic Voting Behavior with Poll Information by Fairstein, Roy et al.
Predicting Strategic Voting Behavior with
Poll Information
Roy Fairstein, Adam Lauz, Kobi Gal, Reshef Meir
Abstract
The question of how people vote strategically under uncertainty has attracted much
attention in several disciplines. Theoretical decision models have been proposed
which vary in their assumptions on the sophistication of the voters and on the infor-
mation made available to them about others’ preferences and their voting behavior.
This work focuses on modeling strategic voting behavior under poll information. It
proposes a new heuristic for voting behavior that weighs the success of each candidate
according to the poll score with the utility of the candidate given the voters’ prefer-
ences. The model weights can be tuned individually for each voter. We compared
this model with other relevant voting models from the literature on data obtained
from a recently released large scale study. We show that the new heuristic outper-
forms all other tested models. The prediction errors of the model can be partly
explained due to inconsistent voters that vote for (weakly) dominated candidates.
1 Introduction
It is well accepted that people often vote strategically in political and other situations,
taking into account not just their preferences, but also beliefs about how their vote would
affect the outcome [7, 2]. Researchers in economics, political science, and more recently
in the computational social choice community, suggested various mathematical models to
capture the strategic decision that a voter faces [6, 5, 8]. The gains from a certain action
depend not only on the preferences of the voter, but also on the votes of others. Thus, part
of the difficulty in predicting a voter’s decision arises from the fact that there is uncertainty
about others’ voting decisions, i.e., what can be inferred from the poll about the actual
votes. Theoretical models describe this uncertainty in the following different ways, which
can lead to different predictions of a voter’s actions.
• Expected utility maximization. A rational voter maximizes her expected utility with
respect to a probability distribution over the actions of the other voters. The dis-
tribution itself may be given exogenously (e.g., by a poll with known variance as in
our model), or derived via equilibrium analysis from the uncertain preferences of the
other voters. Such models were developed mainly in the economics literature and are
sometimes known as the “calculus of voting” [15, 11, 12].
• Voting heuristics. In these models the voter uses some (typically simple) function
that states which action to use at any given situation. The voter is not assumed to be
rational, and may not even have a cardinal utility measure or an explicit probabilistic
representation of the different outcomes. For example, according to the 2-pragmatist
heuristics, the voter behaves as if only the two candidates leading the poll are partic-
ipating [14].
• Bounded rationality. These models present a mid-point between utility maximization
and heuristics. The voter makes a rational strategic decision based on a heuristic
belief, rather than accurate probabilistic belief. One example of such a model is local
dominance [10], which assumes that each voter derives a set of possible outcomes based
on a poll, and then selects a non-dominated action within these outcomes.
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We evaluated the different models on data obtained from Tal et al. [16] who implemented
several voting scenarios in controlled experiments involving humans in different scenarios
that vary the number of voters, the poll information, and voters’ preferences. Our main find-
ings are that the AU model outperforms all other models in all scenarios. The k-pragmatist
heuristic model which considers only a limited number of candidates when making decisions
comes in second. The bounded-rational models obtained the worst performance.
1.1 Contribution
Our first contribution is an extensive evaluation of various decision models on real-world
data. We use the data of Tal et al. [16], where human subjects with dictated preferences are
exposed to a poll over three candidates and make a single voting decision under the Plurality
rule. This is the simplest possible setting that involves a nontrivial strategic decision.
This is the first time that these models are tested versus voting decision with poll infor-
mation. In fact, for some of them this is the first empirical test at all.
Our second contribution is new heuristic voting rule, inspired by a similar model of
Bowman et al. [4], that takes into account both the utility of a candidate and its attainability.
The Attainability-Utility (AU) decision model outperforms all other decision models we tested
in predicting human votes.
This contributes to the understanding of the factors that determine people’s strategic
voting and can lead to new theories of voting behavior that combine rational and boundedly
rational behavior.
1.2 Related Work
We are not aware of another controlled experiment where voters face multiple strategic
decisions with poll information. Yet, similar experiments were conducted in which groups
of human players voted strategically with dictated preference profiles.
Closest to our work is a recent paper by Tyszler and Schram [17], who showed that
the strategic behavior of voters in the lab using is consistent with a quantal best-response
equilibrium. The main difference is that their subjects played a strategic game versus other
human players, and the information they had was the preferences of other voters rather
than poll information. Similar game-theoretic experiments along that line were conducted
in [7, 2, 18]. In particular, these studies have shown that strategic voting in the lab increases
with the amount of information subjects received about others’ preferences and actions.
A different line of works in political science compared theoretical models against actual
votes in political elections (using exit polls to obtain the truthful preferences). For example,
Blais et al. [3] tested the calculus of voting model on empirical data from political elections
and focused on voter’s decision to vote/abstain. They concluded that the model has some
explanatory power but is far from explaining the data completely, and did not compare to
other decision models. In contrast, Abramson et al. [1] concluded that voting behavior in
US primary elections is consistent with the calculus of voting, but observed obvious strategic
behavior only in ∼13% of the voters, a bit higher than the fraction that seem to vote at
random.
In contrast to controlled experiments, such datasets typically contain few decisions of
each voter (usually just one), and are this insufficient to test decision models versus indi-
vidual behavior.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we provide the necessary background for our work. An (anonymous) score
aggregation rule with m candidates C is a function f : Nm → 2C \ ∅, mapping vectors of
candidates’ scores to a subset of winning candidates. In particular, the Plurality rule lets
each voter vote for a single candidate, collects the total number of votes s ∈ Nm, and selects
f(s) = arg maxc∈C s(c).
We consider a single voter who faces a decision, to vote for one of several candidates C.
The voter has a cardinal utility function u : C → R, where ui(c) is the utility of the voter
if candidate c wins (different utility for each candidate). The utility of a subset of winners
W ⊆ C is u(W ) = 1|W |
∑
c∈W u(c). Denote by U(C) the set of all utility functions over the
set C. We denote by f(s+ c) the outcome of the score vector s with one additional vote to
c.
Prior to her vote, the voter is faced with poll information, which is a point estimate of
candidates scores under the Plurality voting rule. Formally, the poll is a vector s ∈ Nm,
where s(c) is the number of voters expected to vote for candidate c. There is a joint
probability distribution D ∈ ∆(Nm × Nm) over pairs of “real outcomes” and polls.1 The
voter is not explicitly informed of this distribution.
A decision model (for Plurality with m candidates and a poll) is a function M : U(C)×
Nm → C, where M(u, s) ∈ C is the vote of a voter with utility function u, using decision
model M given a poll s. We use a superscript for the name of the decision model (e.g.,
MTruth), and subscripts to denote voter-specific parameters, if relevant. We restrict our
attention to deterministic decision models in this work. We demonstrate with two simple
examples. First, the decision model of a voter who is always truthful regardless of the poll
is MTruth(u, s) = arg maxc∈C u(c).
Next, consider a rational voter that believes the poll to be a completely accurate repre-
sentation of the other votes. Such a voter can predict that the outcome of voting c is f(s+c),
and her decision will be MBR(u, s) ∈ arg maxc∈C u(f(s + c)), i.e., a “best response” to the
votes of the other voters (with some assumption on how to vote when there are multiple
best responses).
For exposition, we introduce a running example with 5 candidates, and specify which
candidate the voter will choose under every decision model.
Example 1 (Running example). The set of candidates is C = {q1, . . . , q5}. A voter’s utility
is described by the vector u = (40, 30, 20, 10, 0) (preferences are lexicographic). Poll scores
are given by s = (25, 70, 20, 100, 80).
Figure 1 shows the scores of all candidates graphically. Both MTruth and MBR always
select q1.
2.1 Decision models from the literature
In this section we briefly describe some decision-making models of voting behavior from the
literature, one for each of the approaches specified above (heuristic, rational, and bounded-
rational). In Section 3 we describe our decision model developed for this study, and in
Section 4 we provide a detailed comparison of this model to the decision-making models
below as well as several baseline models.
1A priori, this distribution could be arbitrary, but in most realistic cases there is some correlation between
the real score of a candidate and its score in the poll.
Decision model vote
Prag, k = 2 q4
Prag, k = 4 q1
CV, η = 8 q2
CV, η = 10000 q4
LD, r = 0.01 q1
LD, r = 0.08 q2
LD + LB, r = 0.01 q4
LD + LB, r = 0.08 q2
Figure 1: The poll s from Example 1, and the candidate selected by each decision model.
k-pragmatist The first model we consider is the simple k-pragmatist heuristic [14]. For-
mally, let Bk(s) contain the k candidates with highest score in s, then the pragmatist
decision model with parameter k selects the most preferred candidate among them, i.e.,
MPragk (u, s) = arg max
c∈Bk(s)
u(c).
We allow k to be an individual parameter that differs from voter to voter.
In Figure 1 we see that for k = 2 the voter look only at the two leading candidates (q4
and q5), and therefore will vote to the one that is more preferred among them. For k = 4,
the voter considers all candidates except q3 as possible winners, and therefore will vote for
his most preferred candidate q1.
Calculus of voting The calculus of voting suggests that a voter always votes in a way
that maximizes her expected utility [15, 12]. The complications of the model usually arise
from the fact that the voter is assumed to know only the other voters’ preferences, and uses
an equilibrium model to predict their votes. However, we consider a simpler version where
the distribution of votes is given exogenously [11].
Recall that we defined D as a joint distribution over actual scores and polls. We denote
by D(s) the distribution on the actual scores, conditional on poll scores s. Denote by
Ps,D(x, y) = Prs′∼D(s)
[
(f(s′) = {x} and f(s′ + y) = {x, y}) or
(f(s′) = {x, y} and f(s′ + y) = {y})
]
,
the probability that the voter is pivotal for y versus x when the poll is s. That is, voting for
y makes y a joint or unique winner. Then, the voter votes so as to maximize her expected
utility:
MCVD (u, s) = arg max
c∈C
∑
c′ 6=c
Ps,D(c′, c)(u(c)− u(c′)).
To make the CV model concrete, we need to pin it down to a specific distribution D. For
this paper, we use the way that scores were generated in the experiment of Tal et al. [16].
Specifically, given poll s of a n-voter population, the actual score vector s′ is obtained by
sampling n votes from a multinomial distribution whose parameters are ( s(c)n )c∈C .
We use Ps,η as a shorthand for Ps,D whenD(s) is a multinomial distribution with η voters
as explained above. When η = n (i.e., the true number of voters), this means that MCVη
selects the candidate that exactly maximizes the voter’s expected utility, since Ps,n(x, y) is
the true probability that the voter is pivotal.
However, the MCVη decision model allows for a more flexible, bounded-rational decision:
when η < n the voter overestimates her true pivot probability, and thus her influence on
the outcome, whereas η > n means that the voter underestimates her influence.
In Figure 1 we see that for η = 8 the voter believes she is pivotal with sufficiently high
probability to substantially increase the chance of q2 to win. However for η = 10007, the
voter believes that any tie except a tie of (q4, q5) is highly improbable, and therefore will
vote for q4.
Local dominance Under the Local dominance model [10, 9], the voter has an ‘uncertainty
parameter’ r. Given poll s with n participants, the voter considers as possible (without
assigning any explicit probability) all score vectors s′ such that |s(c) − s′(c)| ≤ r · n for
all c ∈ C. Then, the voter selects an undominated action (i.e., candidate) given this set of
possible outcomes. Meir et al. [10] characterize the undominated candidates:
• Let W be all candidates whose score in s is at least maxc∈C s(c)− 2rn.
• If |W | ≥ 2, then the undominated candidates are all candidates in W except the least
preferred.
• If |W | = 1, then all candidates are undominated.
Denote by U(s, u, r) the set of undominated candidates in poll s for a voter with utility u
and parameter r. The decision model of such a voter is
MLDr (u, s) = arg max
c∈U(s,u,r)
u(c).
This assumes that the voter selects the most preferred undominated candidate, if more than
one exists.
In Figure 1 we see that for r = 0.01 the voter believes that the poll is very accurate (the
score of each candidate may change by at most rn = 3 votes), and there is only one possible
winner (W = {q4}). In this case, the voter remains truthful and MLD0.01(u, s) = q1. When
r = 0.08, the voter believes that the poll is not very accurate and hence W = {q2, q4, q5}.
3 The Attainability-Utility Heuristic
We suggest a new heuristic MAU that separately evaluates the attainability (an approx-
imation of the success of each candidate according to the poll score) and the utility of
the candidate given the voter’s preferences. It selects the candidate that maximizes their
weighted geometric mean. The heuristic is partly inspired by a rule that was used in the
simulations of Bowman et al. [4] for multi-issue voting.2
Given a poll s, we compute the attainability of each voter c similarly to [4]:
aβ(c, s) =
1
1 + exp(−β · ( s(c)n − 1m ))
∈ [0, 1].
Then, for some small constant ε > 0, we define:
MAUα,β(u, s) = arg max
c∈C
HAUα,β(u, s, c), where H
AU
α,β(u, s, c) =
(
(ε+ u(c))α · (ε+ aβ(c, s))2−α
)
.
2In [4], attainability was computed for each issue separately and there were additional factors such as
learning from the past. All factors were multiplied to obtain the heuristic attractiveness of the candidate.
Figure 2: Attainability as a function of candidate poll scores for different values of β.
Intuitively, the α parameter trades-off the relative importance of attainability and utility,
where α = 0 means the voter always selects the candidate with maximal score,3 and α = 2
means the voter is always truthful.
The β parameter can be thought of as the accuracy of the poll in the eyes of the voter,
similarly to the role of parameter r in the LD model and η in the CV model.
Figure 2 shows how β affects the attainability score aβ(s). Candidates that are tied have
the same attainability. High β means that a small advantage in score translates to a large
gap in attainability.
Table 1 shows the AU model behavior over Example 1 with different parameters. For α
close to 2, the voter is tend to be more truthful, however when there is a big gap in votes
between candidates, β which of the top preferences to choose. There is big gap between q1
and q2, therefore when β is big, the gap will cause a bigger difference in the score and will
cause to vote for q2. In contrast When β is small, this gap is less taken into account, and
the voter will vote for q1 . In contrast, when α is close to 0, the model considers the poll
as more important: when β is large, smaller changes in the poll will have more effect on
the decision and therefore only q2, q4 and q5 have non-negligible attainability; for small β
the difference in poll have less effect and therefore preference 4 was chosen. Notice that no
matter what the parameters are, the model will never choose to vote for q3 or q5, since they
are each dominated by another candidate with higher score and utility.
H(q1) H(q2) H(q3) H(q4) H(q5) M
AU
α,β(u, s)
α = 1.8, β = 30 382.9 433.3 100.1 64.0 0.01 q2
α = 1.8, β = 10 578.7 413.2 162.6 61.4 0.01 q1
α = 0.2, β = 30 ≈ 0 1.18 ≈ 0 1.54 0.51 q4
α = 0.2, β = 10 0.16 0.77 0.11 1.06 0.3 q4
Table 1: MAUα,β heuristic score and decision in Example 1, for various parameter values.
3This is the only case where ε > 0 is needed, as u(c) may be 0.
4 Methodology
Dataset We evaluated the different models on data obtained from Tal et al. [16] who
implemented several voting scenarios in controlled experiments involving humans. Some of
this data is publicly available at the link votelib.org. The data was obtained from 595
distinct subjects. Each subject played up to 20 rounds of voting with 3 candidates, each
time with different preferences and poll information. The poll provided a noisy indication of
the results of the voting. The voting instances can be divided into six different “scenarios”
corresponding to different orders of candidates’ scores in the poll once preferences are held
fixed (See two leftmost columns in Table 2).
We denote the candidate as Q for the most preferred, Q′ for the second and Q′′ for the
least preferred. The reward was 10¢ for each round where Q was elected, 5¢ for Q′, and 0¢
for Q′′. Note that only in scenarios E and F, where Q is ranked last at the poll, the voter
may have a monetary incentive to vote for Q′, and never has an incentive to vote for Q′′.
4.1 Evaluated decision models
In addition to our decision model MAUα,β , we evaluate the following single-parameter decision
models described in Section 2.1: MPragk ,M
CV
η ,M
LD
r . To these models, we add several other
baselines.
Voter type based model Tal, Meir and Gal [16] identified 3 distinct types of voter
behavior, albeit without suggesting an explicit decision model:
1. Voters who are always truthful (TRT voters, about 10%-15% of subjects);
2. Voters that often compromise when Q is ranked last (CMP voters, about 40% of
subject), and otherwise vote truthfully;
3. Voters that often compromise AND select the leader Q′ when ranked first (LB voters,
about 50% of subjects).
They also identified a subgroup of subjects who select unjustified actions (a candidate c
where there is c′ that is both more preferred and higher-ranked) more than once. The
behavior of these voters (about 5%-10% of the dataset) is naturally harder to predict for
any decision model. We analyze the results for all subjects, but return to the issue of
unjustified actions and voters in Section 5.3.
Based on their distinction of types, we consider the simple TMG decision model MTMGT .
The parameter T ∈ {TRT,CMP,LB} is the voter type. It is defined as follows:
• MTMGTRT (u, s) = MTruth(u, s) = Q;
• MTMGCMP (u, s) = Q′ if Q is ranked last in s, and Q otherwise;
• MTMGLB (u, s) = Q′ if Q′ is ranked first in s, and MTMGLB (u, s) = MTMGCMP (u, s) otherwise.
Local-Dominance with Leader bias Note that the findings of [16] indicate a strong
tendency to bias for the leader of the poll, which is not taken into account in the Local
dominance model. We thus consider a “leader-biased” variation of the local dominance
model:
MLD+LBr (u, s) = M
LD
r (u, s) if |W | ≥ 2, and otherwise MLD+LBr (u, s) = W.
In Figure 1 we see that this model acts similar to the LD model, however when there is
only one possible winner, this model allows the voter to be leader biased and voter for his
fourth preference instead of being truthful.
Black-box neural network predictor Another baseline we used was a general black-box
classifier. We extracted about 30 relevant features, including the poll scores, the differences
in poll scores, voter’s utility and the voter type as identified in [16]. The “decision model”
MNN then feeds all features to the classifier, which predicts an action in C.
The classifier consisted of a single-hidden-layer feed-forward neural network classifier.
The input nodes represented features that summarized voters’ preferences, and the poll
information that was provided to them, and information about the voter types. The classifier
was implemented using the nnet package of R.4
4.2 Evaluation metrics
Prediction and parameter fitting The prediction was performed using leave-one-out
method. For each voter we excluded one of his rounds, one by one. Using the rest of the
rounds we learned the relevant model parameters and predicted what the voter will do in
the excluded round.
Confusion matrices The predictions for a specific decision model result in a confusion
matrix : The entry A(x, y) in the matrix specifies how many times the model MAU predicted
x and the actual voter action was y (a matrix where all off-diagonal entries are 0 indicates
perfect prediction). Both rows and columns are sortedQ,Q′, Q′′. An example for a confusion
matrix from out data:
confusion matrix: A =
 5409 441 13232 2538 90
117 188 373

For example, in 441 samples (4.7% of the data), the studied model in the example predicted
Q′ but the voter selected Q.
Performance measures From the confusion matrix we compute standard measures for
multi-class prediction problems [13]. These include precision, recall as well as the f-measure,
which is the harmonic mean of precision and recall, for every candidate c ∈ C.
prec(c) =
A(c, c)
ColA(c)
; recall(c) =
A(c, c)
RowA(c)
; F (c) =
2prec(c) · recall(c)
prec(c) + recall(c)
,
where ColA(c) =
∑
c′∈C A(c
′, c), RowA(c) =
∑
c′∈C A(c, c
′). Since there are three possible
actions, we calculate a single f-measure by weighting each f-measure by the number of times
this action was played:
FA =
1
‖A‖1
∑
c∈C
RowA(c)F (c).
In the example matrix above, prec(Q′) = 2538441+2538+188 = 0.801, recall(Q
′) =
2538
32+2538+90 = 0.954, and F (Q
′) = 2·0.954·0.8010.954+0.801 = 0.87. For the entire matrix, we would
get FA =
5982·0.937+2660·0.87+678·0.586
9320 = 0.892.
An f-measure of 1 means that the decision model perfectly explains the data.
4https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/nnet/index.html
5 Results and Analysis
Table 2 shows the f-measure of each decision model. We emphasize that the individual
parameters of each voter were learned using leave-one-out to avoid overfitting. The results
are separated to the different poll scenarios, as they each reflect a different strategic decision.
The f-measure is also presented graphically in the solid bars shown in Figure 3.
scenario frequency AU LD LD+LB CV Prag TMG NN
A Q > Q′ > Q′′ (15.0%) 0.902 0.902 0.902 0.902 0.902 0.902 0.904
B Q > Q′′ > Q′ (11.1%) 0.903 0.903 0.903 0.903 0.903 0.903 0.909
C Q′ > Q > Q′′ (14.8%) 0.734 0.389 0.691 0.389 0.610 0.626 0.697
D Q′′ > Q > Q′ (16.9%) 0.722 0.657 0.678 0.657 0.695 0.657 0.709
E Q′ > Q′′ > Q (22.7%) 0.736 0.486 0.680 0.642 0.708 0.655 0.704
F Q′′ > Q′ > Q (19.5%) 0.571 0.414 0.461 0.470 0.559 0.407 0.551
total 0.759 0.591 0.706 0.676 0.729 0.708 0.739
Table 2: f-measure of all tested models, separated by scenario.
5.1 Main findings
From Table 2 and Figure 3 we can derive the following insights:
• In Scenarios A and B, all decision models (except NN) predict that voters are always
truthful, and thus have the same high performance.
• In all scenarios C-F, the AU model outperforms all other models.
• The “sophisticated” bounded-rational models CV and LD have the worst performance.
In particular, they demonstrate poor performance in Scenario C where voters’ decision
is influenced by leader-bias [16].
• The k-pragmatist heuristics performs surprisingly well, considering its utter simplicity
and the fact that it only allows three types of voters (for k = 1, 2 or 3).
• The LB variant of local dominance strictly improves its performance, placing it roughly
at par with k-pragmatist and the neural network predictor.
• Scenario F is the most difficult one for almost all models, with the best models having
an f-measure slightly above 0.5.
5.2 Upper bound on Performance
The data we use to fit the parameters of each voter is sparse. Each voter has at most
20 samples, and in some scenarios only 1 or 2 samples (or none at all). Therefore, even
leaving out a single sample may significantly hurt performance. In order to find what is
the maximum explanatory power of each model, we re-calculated the f-measure for each
model using the entire dataset both as a training set and a test set. Clearly this approach is
suspect to overfitting, so it only provides an upper bound on the prediction ability of each
model.
These upper bounds appear as stripped bars in Fig. 3. Note that our AU model still
outperforms all other models when we compare upper bounds (with the slight exception
of the NN model in Scenarios A and B). The numerical upper bounds can be found in the
appendix Table 3.
Figure 3: The f-measure of each decision model in all scenarios. The solid bars show the
prediction performance, whereas the stripped bars show the upper bound on the performance
of each model.
5.3 Where are the errors?
Next, we dig deeper into the results. We want to see what kinds of mistakes the AU decision
model tends to have. For example, whether these mistakes concentrate on a specific subset
of subjects or scenarios. These insights could be used later to improve the model, and to
design further experimental evaluation.
Errors by poll size First, the model seems to perform equally well for all poll sizes (see
Table 4 in appendix), even as different as n = 8 and n = 10000. We thus conclude that the
size of the poll is not a major factor in explaining the prediction errors.
C. (Q′ > Q > Q′′) D. (Q′′ > Q > Q′) E. (Q′ > Q′′ > Q) F. (Q′′ > Q′ > Q) 734 153 0241 465 0
16 7 0
  1323 0 116128 0 35
171 0 119
  480 348 0231 1414 0
13 42 0
  487 227 74275 606 93
78 175 153

Figure 4: Confusion matrix for different scenarios.
Errors by type Figure 4 shows the confusion matrices of the AU decision model in all
the “interesting” scenarios C-F. Recall that all the off-diagonal entries indicate prediction
errors, where the column is the predicted action (Q,Q′ or Q′′, in that order) and the row is
the action of the subject.
As can be seen in the table, most of the prediction errors in Scenario C are due to
under-prediction of voting for the leader Q′. In contrast, most of the errors in Scenario E
are due to over prediction of a strategic compromise Q′. We can also see why Scenario F is
the hardest, as all three actions are played frequently.
Errors by subject Every decision model can capture the behavior of some human sub-
jects better than others. To check how well different subjects are predicted, we computed
the confusion matrices and f-measure for each of the 595 subjects, when actions are pre-
dicted by MAU. An f-measure of 1 means that all actions of this subject were predicted
correctly.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of subjects’ individual f-measures. We can see that about
46% of the subjects are predicted very well (f-measure over 0.9), 29% predicted reasonably
well (f-measure over 0.8), and the rest of the subjects (about 25%) are with f-measure less
than 0.8.
This means that most of the prediction errors are due to a relatively small subset of
subjects. One possible explanation is that these are the subjects who played fewer games,
and therefore it is harder for the model to learn their parameters, however we get a similar
distribution after omitting subjects who played under 10 games.
The main question is thus whether voters whose behavior is not predicted well follow a
different decision model than AU, or are somehow inherently unpredictable.
Figure 5: A histogram showing, for every f-measure F , how many subjects have f-measure
of F .
Inherently inconsistent behavior To answer the above question, we considered types
of behavior that would be ‘inherently unpredictable.’ For example, [16] categorized as
“unjustified” a sample (s, a) (action a ∈ C under poll s) if there is another candidate a′
that ‘dominates’ the selected action a (a′ is more preferred than a and s(a′) ≥ s(a)). They
showed that voters with at least two unjustified actions have a random component in their
behavior.
We suggest an additional criterion that is based on inconsistency among a voter’s own
actions. We say that a sample (s, a) is inconsistent if there is another sample (s∗, a∗) of the
same voter, such that: (i) a∗ 6= a; (ii) s∗(a) ≥ s(a); and (iii) s∗(a′) ≤ s(a′) for all a′ 6= a. In
words, a is in a weakly better position in s∗, but still the voter prefers to vote for another
candidate a∗.
Figure 6 (left) shows the f-measure of all voters, classified by their consistency type. We
can see that the left tail of the histogram (i.e., almost all voters with low f-measure) are
either “unjustified” or “inconsistent.”
Figure 6: Left: f-measure per voter for voters with more than 10 samples. We divided the
population into “unjustified” voters who played at least two unjustified actions; “inconsis-
tent” voters; and all others. Right: Prediction accuracy in each scenario, divided by action
type.
This might suggest that perhaps prediction cannot be significantly improved. We thus
tested how many of the prediction errors themselves were of dominated/inconsistent actions.
This can be seen in Figure 6 (right). The plaid gray bars represent all prediction errors that
cannot be explained away as dominated or inconsistent actions.
We conclude that while most of the prediction errors are indeed due voters that behave
inconsistently sometimes, most of the actual errors are “plaid” especially in scenario F. Thus
there is still room for improvement of our decision models.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
It seems that the Attainability-Utility heuristics explains quite well the behavior of most
subjects in the data, except those with inherent inconsistencies in their replies. To improve
the model we can perform more experiments where we use different utilities for the candi-
dates (different utility gaps, negative utility, etc) and have more than 3 candidates. Those
experiments can expose behavior that do not exist in the current data. Interestingly, the
NN black-box model sometimes successfully predicts “unjustified” actions, and we can try to
understand when is this possible.
6.1 Parameters distribution in the population
Since the α and β parameters correspond to the natural cognitive inclinations, their distri-
bution can in principle reveal important information on the types of strategic voters in the
population. Unfortunately, it is hard to make clear patterns from the parameter distribu-
tion. Indeed, it seems that the distribution of β parmeter is bi-modal with peaks at 15 and
30 (see appendix). However this is probably an artifact of the way we select parameters
for subjects with a large range of optimal parameters (like truthful voters). More experi-
mentation in different conditions is required if we want to better understand the population
structure.
One pattern that does stand out is that α values seem to be much higher in the ‘small
n’ condition. This may suggest that not only the relative attainability matters: when n is
low and the voter has a substantial chance to be pivotal, the importance of utility increases.
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A Additional Results
scenario AU LD LD + LB CV Prag TMG NN
A 0.902 0.902 0.902 0.902 0.902 0.902 0.918
B 0.903 0.903 0.903 0.903 0.903 0.903 0.922
C 0.870 0.389 0.819 0.389 0.703 0.693 0.741
D 0.784 0.657 0.719 0.657 0.730 0.657 0.733
E 0.813 0.676 0.795 0.730 0.766 0.659 0.744
F 0.728 0.525 0.609 0.533 0.640 0.411 0.638
total 0.841 0.671 0.795 0.708 0.781 0.720 0.784
Table 3: Upper bounds on the performance of each model.
f-measure
total scenario C scenario D scenario E scenario F
n < 10 0.775 0.747 0.767 0.735 0.534
n ≈ 100 0.739 0.710 0.653 0.746 0.588
n ≈ 1000 0.735 0.703 0.705 0.703 0.598
n ≈ 10000 0.786 0.784 0.707 0.782 0.553
Table 4: f-measure for different poll size n.
B Black box classifier
The “decision model” MNN is a single-hidden-layer feed-forward neural network classifier.
The model consists of a layer of input nodes that represents the features we use in the dataset,
A layer of nodes which is called the ”hidden” layer and an output layer that uses the softmax
activation function in order to output a classification to one of the possible classes in C.
The flow of the data is from input to output in one direction and no recurrences occur in the
flow process as opposed to recurrent neural networks. The input nodes are connected to the
output nodes via the ”hidden” layer nodes (or neurons) by weighted edges. The algorithm
is a supervised learning algorithm that takes a set of class labled records and iteratively
learns and adjusts the weights on the edges by comparing the output of each input record
to it’s class label. The model is iterative and can be updated easily by new records that it
haven’t seen yet. We use a configuration of 3 units in the ”hidden” layer. In our domain we
use a set of vote records that consists of raw and generated features. Some of the generated
features are normalized by the number of votes in the poll configuration. The class label of
each record is the selected preference of the voter which can be one of {Q,Q′, Q′′}. Using
feature selection techniques we selected the following features:
(a) Poll and preference information: Candidates poll votes, normalized poll gaps
between candidates, preference order, the normalized gap between the leader and the
most preferred candidate and the scenario which is the combination of the preference
order and the poll information.
(b) Voter information: A-ratios which are the number of rounds the voter selected
action A divided by the number of rounds it was available. A is the action which we
Figure 7: A scatter plot ot the α and β parameters of each of the 595 voters.
Figure 8: Distribution of the α parameter for n < 10 (left) and n ≥ 100 (right).
determine using the selected preference (Q,Q′ or Q′′) and the order of the preferences
in the poll (namely the scenario). We also use the voter type feature which can be
one of {TRT, LB, OTHER} and is determined by a threshold values over the A-ratio
values. For example: if TRT-ratio > 0.9 then the voter type is TRT (Truthful).
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Figure 9: Distribution of the β parameter for n < 10 (left) and n ≥ 100 (right).
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